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Legacies of Nuremberg

John Q. Barrett*
I am very grateful to the leaders and sponsoring organizations that have
brought the Dialogs together for ten years, particularly this year in this
very special place. I also thank, humbly, Germany and Nuremberg.
We are seventy years out from a Nuremberg trial process that was
filled with participants who could not have imagined the Germany, the
Nuremberg city of human rights, and their sponsorship and teaching,
that we all are beneficiaries of today. It is to the great credit of today's
generations of German leaders that they have built this Nuremberg.
My topic, "The Legacy of Nuremberg," is not a Justice Robert H.
Jackson topic, although I will make some points that concern Jackson
or are "Jacksonian." I am in this lecture trying to imagine some of
how I think Justice Jackson and his Nuremberg trial colleagues would
have thought seventy years ago, looking ahead to our day and farther,
about the potential legacies of the Nuremberg trial.
"Nuremberg" the Word
I begin by stepping back from Nuremberg trials expertise, which
each of you has, to consider a more general question: What does
"Nuremberg"-which is, as a single word, the short form way
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of referring to the post-World War II Nuremberg trials of Nazi
war criminals-mean today, out in the world? Where does one
find references to "Nuremberg"?
To answer these preliminary questions, I reviewed popular press
during the past few months. Here is some of what I found about how
the word "Nuremberg" gets used, invoked, and also tossed around
today, outside of the legal and historical literature.
"Nuremberg" Is a Word That Pertainsto Nazis
I found, no surprise, that the word "Nuremberg" is often used to
refer to something about World War II-era Nazis and their crimesthe people and matters that the Nuremberg trials of course began to
address immediately after the War.
Those usages break down into two categories. One concerns the
original, WWII-era Nazis. For example, in the United Kingdom,
stories report public outrage concerning twenty former members of the
Waffen-SS, now elderly, retired, men, who live in the United Kingdom
and receive public pensions. The Waffen-SS was, of course, convicted
here in Nuremberg in 1946 as a criminal organization. Press regarding
what those aging, real Nazis are getting away with invokes Nuremberg.
Another context in which "Nuremberg" is mentioned in press
today concerning World War II-era Nazis is in reporting on current
German efforts to prosecute Nazi war criminals-spdt, aber nicht
zu spdt. These efforts include the John Demjanjuk trial in Munich
in 2011. Identified, eventually and accurately, as a guard at Sobibor,
Demjanjuk was convicted as an accessory to the murders in that camp.
These efforts also include the 2015 conviction of Oskar Grdning,
the so-called Auschwitz bookkeeper; the Spring 2016 conviction
of Reinhold Hanning, who was an Auschwitz guard; and the trial,
begun this month in New Brandenburg but proceeding very fitfully,
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of former Auschwitz guard Hubert Zafke, who is charged for his work
in the month in which Anne Frank was delivered by train and became
an Auschwitz prisoner, before she then was shipped to Bergen Belsen
and perished. In the context of criminal cases against these real, if old
and increasingly scarce, former cogs in the crimes of Nazi Germany,
the Nuremberg trials are remembered as history, precedent, and, for
the legal system, performance challenge.
The second category of "Nazis," if you will, are today's alleged Nazis.
I use the word carefully-my point is only that people do point their
fingers and accuse others of being Nazis.
One example, almost amusing but really just deeply appalling, is
Ursula Auerbach, age eighty-seven. A friend of Heinrich Himmler's
daughter, Auerbach is the so-called "Nazi Granny" in today's
Germany. She was convicted in 2016 in Holmberg and sentenced to
eight months in prison for incitement and Holocaust denial. That is
her hobby, it seems, and it is against German national law. She has
assumed Nazi culpability, and Nuremberg-invoking legal liability, by
her speaking and its criminal consequences.
Other examples of mentioning Nuremberg when accusing persons of
Nazi behavior today come from outside Germany. Just last week, at
the Commonwealth of Independent States summit in Kurdistan, the
leaders of those former Soviet Republics adopted many statements,
including one noting this seventieth anniversary year of the
international Nuremberg trial, its verdicts, and its principles. Also last
week, at the United Nations General Assembly, the representative of
the Russian Federation spoke emphatically about the need to permit
no revision of the history of WWII, no glorification of Nazism ... and
then, for some reason, his next paragraph was about Ukraine. Russian
Federation memory, celebration, and rhetoric about Nuremberg are
not, in other words, limited to historical discussion of the Great
Patriotic War. They also have contemporary political context. The
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Russian Supreme Court, for instance, recently affirmed the criminal
conviction of a blogger who had reposted an article stating-this
will not shock you-that Nazi Germany and the U.S.S.R. were allies
in 1939, 1940, and into the middle of 1941, and that they invaded
Poland together, from their respective sides, in September 1939. This
blogging, the Court held, was ground for criminal conviction.
"Nuremberg"Is a Word That Pertainsto Rule ofLaw Excellence
These uses of the word "Nuremberg" bridge into a second category:
the word as a high legal standard. "Nuremberg" and the Nuremberg
trial are invoked as a great rule of law achievement, a gold medal, a
world championship in some respect.
Examples are prominent in popular culture. In the 2015 film "Bridge
of Spies" concerning a 1960s U.S.-U.S.S.R. prisoner swap in Berlin,
Tom Hanks portrays James B. Donovan. He had been a senior U.S.
Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.) official during World War II and
then a senior member of Justice Jackson's prosecution team prior to
and at Nuremberg. Early in the film, Hanks/Donovan is introduced
as a Brooklyn-based insurance lawyer. Why is he being recruited
into a Cold War spy case? Well, a colleague explains to him, "You
distinguished yourself at Nuremberg." "I was on the prosecution team,"
he concedes-and no further credential is required. Oliver Stone also
invoked Nuremberg in his recent film about Edward Snowden. It says
many things, including, to explain the actions of Stone's "Snowden,"
a passing lecture about the Nuremberg principles.
Writers also mention Nuremberg-trial-as-great-legal-achievement
as they cover and consider the U.S. military commissions in
Guantanamo. They aspired to become regarded, in our time and then
in history, as a twenty-first century Nuremberg. The commission
conveners and leaders, including some highly principled and talented
people, have pointed explicitly to Nuremberg as their model. That
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military commission process, now ten years on since its creation
and fifteen years on since 9/11 and the war in Afghanistan, is mired
in enormous, probably fatal, logistical and legal issues, including
some concerning governmental misconduct. People now, when
discussing the military commissions, mention "Nuremberg" to make
arguments about what has not happened.
"Nuremberg"Is a Word That Pertainsto HistoricalSignificance

A third context in which the word "Nuremberg" is used these
days is as a trope outside of the realms of adjudicative and
legal endeavors. The word is used here as a mark of historical
significance and high brand value.
It appears, for example, in many recent obituaries and death notices
of men who were World War II soldiers. These reports note that,
among life highlights, these men "attended" the Nuremberg trials.
(Apparently Courtroom 600 had thousands of seats that are not
quite visible in late 1940s photographs.) I love, for its modesty
combined with its recognition of the significance of "Nuremberg,"
one recent obituary that noted a man's wife, children, career,
hard work, community endeavors, and that he was "stationed in
Europe during the Nuremberg trials."
On the other hand, and I hope that you catch this as a note of true
absurdity, I noticed a recently published letter in which the writer,
making his point that "following orders" is no defense for the evil
of one's own actions, drove home the emptiness of that purported
excuse by reporting that Adolf Eichmann had offered it when he
took the stand at Nuremberg to explain his role in perpetrating the
Holocaust. I believe that if Eichmann had dropped by Nuremberg in
the late 1940s to testify, someone would have noticed ... and arrested
him. (The writer of course was confusing Eichmann with Auschwitz
commandant Rudolf Hoess-the writer got the name wrong but
otherwise made a cogent point.)
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The conclusion to draw?: "Nuremberg" is, around the world, the word
for something that is big, great, and permanent in modem history.
The International Nuremberg Trial as It Was-Its Legacies for
the Future
This seventy-year anniversary moment is not merely an occasion
to note the continuing, varied, and striking number of references to
"Nuremberg" and the Nuremberg trials. It is, I think, an occasion
to step back, look hard, and locate core aspects of what Nuremberg
really was, and thereby to think carefully about what it means and
what some of its legacies are, for us and for the future.
I will not presume to teach Nuremberg to this crowd. We are the
Nuremberg Academy, including in fact, plus professionally and
informally in our individual pursuits-historical knowledge of the
Nuremberg laws, the Nuremberg trials, and the Nuremberg principles
and their applications is part of the deep background that many
participants in these Dialogs plus many in their public audience share.
Today, September 30, 2016, is the anniversary of the first of the
Nuremberg "Judgments Days." That double plural is an awkward
phrase, and I use it deliberately. On September 30, 1946, and on
October 1, 1946, the International Military Tribunal (IMT), filling two
extensive courtroom days, rendered a series ofjudgments. September
30 was the day of factual and legal findings-in Courtroom 600
seventy years ago, the seated persons, listening to the judicial reading
of the start of the Judgment or to a simultaneous interpreter's voice,
heard no judgment on an individual defendant. That all came the next
day-October 1 was the day of convictions and acquittals and then, in
the afternoon, the sentences imposed on the convicted.
The September 30 IMT judgments were about what the trial evidence
had shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, about the defendants' conduct,
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and what the Third Reich had done across the years 1933-1945 to
consolidate totalitarian power here in Germany, and then as a military
aggressor, occupying power, and perpetrator of atrocities across
Europe. Note that this is the history that this Documentation Center
tells so factually and powerfully. In 1946, the IMT's Judgment was
the first official delivery, in what amounts to a substantial book, of this
factual record. It was based on the captured Nazi documents and the
live witness testimony that the prosecutors had presented as evidence.
The IMT, after making those factual findings, turned to the validity
of legal theories that had been the bases for the London Agreement
creating the tribunal, and for the indictment that had brought
individuals and Nazi organizations to the IMT for adjudication as
charged criminals. The IMT held that the waging of aggressive war
was indeed, by the late 1920s and into the 1930s, a crime against the
international legal order. The IMT also pronounced the legal validity of
the war crimes and the crimes against humanity charges, limited to the
temporal constraints of Nazi war-waging (September 1939 and later).
In addition to the substance of these judgments, the legacies of
Nuremberg include these eight aspects of the trial as it really was:
The Nuremberg Trial Followed War- Winning
We must not overlook that the Nuremberg trial was a war-won
endeavor. Robert Jackson called it a "post-mortem" of the Third Reich.
In other words, the Nazis were killed, as in defeated militarily, as a
predicate to what the Nuremberg trial was able to do. As you can see
on maps, including here in the Documentation Center, Nazi Germany
ceased to exist in May 1945. Its unconditional surrender meant
complete relinquishment of sovereignty, Allied military occupation of
Germany's former landmass, and division of it into respective zones of
French, U.K., U.S., and U.S.S.R. control and total power. Without that
Allied power, the Nuremberg trial could not have happened as it did.
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The Nuremberg Trial Grew Out ofAllied Power and Will
Connected, the Nuremberg trial occurred in a moment-a brief, shining
moment-of power and political will. Succeeding war, succeeding
Nazi Germany, in the occupation, and in the world's 1945 moment,
there was a broad, deep consensus among nations. It is easy to see how
this binary situation developed: a world war pitted evil against good,
and good prevailed; those allies were the united nations; in peacetime,
they created immediately the United Nations, and the international
tribunal created through the London Agreement, and soon the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Genocide Convention,
the Geneva Conventions. . . These things were possible during that
short interval of time, from 1945 until spring 1949, when Telford
Taylor and his U.S. prosecution colleagues concluded the Ministries
Case, the last of the U.S. subsequent proceedings at Nuremberg. Only
that unity of power and will made Nuremberg happen as it did.
The Nuremberg Trial Was Focused on the Crime of War
A third point, in thinking about finding Nuremberg and focusing on
what its core legacies are, is to take very seriously the war focus.
The Allies, in their moment of victory, power, and consensus, looked
back on what had happened. At the core, they identified the Nazi
war-waging as the evil. The IMT adjudged it the "supreme" crime
against the international order and the basis for individual criminal
liability. This is the reality that our friend and hero Benjamin Ferencz
continues to represent and develop in his work: war is at the center of
the concentric circles of evil.
The Nuremberg Trial Occurredin Its Crime Scene
The Nuremberg trial occurred in situ-it was about Nazi Germany,
which had happened here in the land that had been Nazi Germany.
That meant not only the land. In 1945 it also meant the physical
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devastation, enormous piles of rubble, the stench of decaying bodies,
and desperate, starving people.
The crime scene also included things that were not captured well
in photographs. Displaced Persons in organized camps surrounded
Nuremberg, some very close to the Palace of Justice. Other survivors
were living on their own, for example under wood shelters built in
Nuremberg's large Jewish cemetery. These survivors included the
remnants of what had been the Jewish communities of Nuremberg
and Fiirth, the adjacent city. Some had stayed in Nuremberg during
the war, and some had fled, endured, and then made it home.
These persons were in the sightlines of everyone who was a lawyer,
an investigator, an interrogator, and a jurist at Nuremberg. Justice
Jackson's staff, which grew to be very large, included superb lawyers
who did very good work, often day and night. Some took breaks on
occasion to eat and drink at the Grand Hotel, to dance in its Marble
Room, and to fraternize. Others, who happened to be Jews (as many
of Jackson's original team were), were more what the lingo of the
time called "straight arrows." They were very aware of the refugees
and survivors who surrounded the Nuremberg trial, and they visited,
interacted with, and did things to support them. On one occasion, for
example, they diverted U.S. ice cream-occupation-government ice
cream, if you will-to the children of the Fiirth synagogue, celebrating
Rosh Hashanah. This might have been Nuremberg's finest "crime."
Nuremberg in situ meant the investigation-prosecution endeavor
occurring in the war theater, in the nation, on the land mass,
connected to the people. In some war crimes situations, that will
be impossible, or at least very difficult, to replicate-Nuremberg
could and did happen this way because the Allies had won the war
unconditionally, it had ceased entirely, and their power as occupiers
was total. But that is exactly my point.
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The Nuremberg Trial Judgment Was Self-Evident
Afifth dimension and legacy of Nuremberg is its mindset of necessity:
the Allies were, in the end, allied in the conviction that they had to
undertake this criminal trial project and that it had to obtain, through
fair processes to be sure, convictions.
Nuremberg was the Allied response to the self-evident horrors that their
people had confronted, first in war, as the Nazis' military adversaries,
and then at governmental, diplomatic, policy, and occupation levels
following the Nazi surrender. For the Allies, this situation demanded
action. The possibility of walking away-calling it a day; concluding
the war by being fatigued and not doing anything more-was an
implausible alternative, and one that never was considered.
At the other extreme, brutal executive actions-firing squads and
so forth-were another alternative, and also one that was not really
considered. As Justice Jackson stated publicly at the start of the project,
although that option would have been fueled by understandable
vengeance, it would have "violate[d] pledges repeatedly given,
and would not [have] set easily on the American conscience or be
remembered by our children with pride."
For the Allies, there was, in between doing nothing and doing
too much with brutality and potential unfairness, the need
to conduct the international Nuremberg trial as they did it,
and reaching outcomes as it did.
Justice Jackson explained this at the conclusion of his July 26,
1946, closing statement to the IMT:
It is against such a background [of evidence introduced at the
trial] that these defendants now ask this Tribunal to say that
they are not guilty of planning, executing, or conspiring to
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commit this long list of crimes and wrongs. They stand before
the record of this trial as bloodstained Gloucester stood by the

body of his slain king. He begged of the widow, as they beg
"

of you: "Say I slew them not." And the Queen replied, "Then
say they were not slain. But dead they are . . .
If you were to say of these men that they are not guilty, it
would be as true to say that there has been no war, there are
no slain, there has been no crime.
This statement is much quoted but not, I think, much analyzed or
"unpacked." Justice Jackson, a man of words who is remembered for
his famously talented pen, was a close, lifetime student of William
Shakespeare. As a schoolboy in 1909 and continuing into his years
as a law apprentice, Robert Jackson learned from his English teacher
and defacto second mother to read and to love Shakespeare-he read
plays aloud at her home, into the wee hours, in front of the fireplace.
And he memorized Shakespeare, as people then did with great
literature and oratory. Decades later, here in Nuremberg, Jackson was
not carrying the collected works of Shakespeare. Nor did be have
a good Internet connection. He did have, however, a fair amount
of Shakespearean genius packed into his mind. And one can see,
in archives, the paper on which Justice Jackson in 1946 drafted his
closing statement at Nuremberg.
In his statement, Jackson was quoting from Shakespeare's Richard
III. He quoted the scene in which the queen, Lady Anne, confronts
Richard, the Duke of Gloucester, as he stands over the dead body
of King Henry VI. Richard begs Anne to, in effect, let this and other
murders go: "Say I slew them not. . . ." Jackson quoted that line,
and then her rejoinder: "Then say they were not slain. But dead they
are. . ."' In doing so, Jackson was comparing and equating Richard's
request of Anne to what the Nuremberg defendants were, in seeking
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acquittal, asking of the IMT. And he urged it to respond as Anne had
responded to Richard. In other words:
* say I slew them not . . . but he is dead;
* say we are not guilty . . . but there was this war,
covering the continent with death.
Jackson's statement was, in the open, a statement that the facts of
World War II, including its human toll, required the IMT to convict
Nazi defendants of crime-at the basic, human, moral level, this was
a no-brainer, a crime if anything is a crime.
I will add that this Nuremberg belief that heinously destructive conduct
must produce a judgment of criminal guilt is also the best of modem
international humanitarian law-it is where world consensus exists,
without much need for complex diplomacy or persuasion, and where
nations act on their agreement that, "Yes, this is it. This is a crime."
The Nuremberg Trial Was Educational
Nuremberg was also an educational process. It of course was a
documentary case. Robert Jackson had been, maybe for ill from the
perspective of people who wished for trial excitement in Courtroom
600, the Assistant Attorney General who headed the Antitrust
Division in the U.S. Department of Justice for a year (1937).
He knew documents cases, and notice that the Third Reich was
prosecuted at Nuremberg as Alcoa had been by U.S. Department of
Justice in the late 1930s for market domination and price fixing: it
was all there in their own documents. Metal market monopolization
is not remotely the evil recorded in Nazi documents-I am
comparing only the methods of proof.
Nuremberg's educational process occurred in the context of
prosecutors carrying their burden of proving individual criminal
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culpability. But Nuremberg, simultaneously, reached the external,
public audience around the world. And the published record of the
trial is the foundation of historical understanding of the Third Reich.
It is a repository of depth and complexity. Every generation uses it,
and study, teaching, and understanding thereby grow. The Nuremberg
trial record permits us to wrap our minds around the biggest, and
what otherwise might be the least comprehensible, of horrors: the
Nazis in power and World War 11.
The Nuremberg Trial Was Efficient

The Nuremberg trial was relatively selective and brief. As Jackson
boasted at the time, it happened in an amazing hurry. To go from
nothing in May 1945-no judicial institution, no evidence, no Allied
agreement on how to proceed-to the commencement of a trial five
and a half months later was, he said, faster than many automobile
injury cases went to trial in New York State (which is still true). The
trial was expeditious because the Tribunal sat for six days, and long
days, each week. It rationed witness allocations to the defendants and
then cracked down on their extraneous demands. The prosecutors
were permitted to present evidence in summary documents, and the
IMT restricted their slowing moves too. In part this reflected political
will to address public impatience. In part this was just a commendable
commitment to focusing on the core issues, to getting right to them.
The Nuremberg Trial Was Carefully Optimistic
I do mean both of those words. Yes, Nuremberg's optimism included
some very high universal ideals-the "poisoned chalice" line, for
example, which Justice Jackson drafted but never uttered in court,
but then published in the trial record. I suspect that he never said that
"[t]o pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own
lips as well" because he had borrowed it from Shakespeare (Macbeth,
Act 1, Scene 7), and perhaps so obviously that to 1945 Nuremberg
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courtroom ears it would have sounded corny. So although it was in
the opening statement that he drafted, he drew a line through it on
his reading copy and left it unsaid. But the idea that the Allies were
holding themselves---ourselves-too to the standards by which they
were judging Nazi defendants to be criminals was indeed the high and
real universalism of Nuremberg.
The Nuremberg trial stayed, however, within the area of allied
consensus. The U.S.-U.K.-U.S.S.R. postwar alliance was fragile.
The Soviet show trial instinct versus the American-British-French
due process instinct was just barely worked out and bridged over in
London in summer 1945, in the agreement that created the IMT and
got the Allies together to Nuremberg. They did not push it too far, to
their fracture point. Of course they did not put themselves in the dock
alongside the German defendants, and that is a fair criticism. But they
did put people in the dock for the evils each had perpetrated.
The Allies also were in many respects cautious and skeptical,
following Nuremberg, in embarking on projects to codify too much,
too broadly, too permanently, words on paper that the world could
not live up to. Yes, the United Nations General Assembly adopted in
December 1946 the London Agreement of August 1945 and also the
IMT Judgment of Fall 1946-in a summary, conclusory way. Yes,
the UN General Assembly at that same time adopted the proposed
Genocide Convention, Raphael Lemkin's great project and dream,
and sent it forward for states to consider, ratify, and potentially
make real as a new development in international law. But the idea
of a code of crimes, and also the idea of a charter for a permanent
international criminal court, were things that not only the Soviets, but
also the Americans (including Jackson and his colleague and friend
Charles Fahy, legal adviser in Berlin and at Nuremberg, and then at
the United Nations and the Department of State) and the British, were
hesitant to push after Nuremberg. And why? Not because they were
soft on high ideals and universal justice. It was because they were
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practical about making progress. They, as international colleagues,
had gotten Nuremberg done. And they realized that it would be
a risky, perhaps a backsliding, step to attempt in the real world
following Nuremberg to be too utopian.
On the other hand, Nuremberg architects such as Jackson and Fahy
were interested in moving the United Nations as far as it could really
go. This explains how the IMT judgments on September 30 and
October 1, 1946, gave birth to the UN General Assembly actions of
two-plus months later. The process was push-pull and hydraulicthey toggled well between utopian, idealistic, visionary leadership
and pragmatic, political judgments. I suspect that today's international
court officials and their national counterparts recognize that as more
or less their own job description.

Where does all of that leave us? It leaves the world, especially those
of us who are in the heart of "Nuremberg" expertise as teachers and
leaders, using this word as an inheritance of real meanings and duties.
We each try in our ways to teach Nuremberg because really to get it
requires careful study, not just casual invocation. To study Nuremberg
means reading it, debating it, and critiquing it. When we do that, we
are better positioned to live up to it, and to build upon it-to take
"Nuremberg" and a world of law and, we hope, less war and more
peace and humanity, to numbers that will be much bigger than seventy.
I close with an antique phrase from Robert H. Jackson: he said that the
meaning of the Nuremberg trial would become clear in "the century
run." We are seventy years down from 1946. We have thirty more
years to go before that century will have run. I am grateful to be
involved and sharing that project of giving meaning to Nuremberg,
continuing to do its work, with each of you.

